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THE OVERLOOKED ROLE OF THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT IN PROTECTING 
THE WESTERN ENVIRONMENT: NEPA IN THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT 
Michael C. Blumm* & Keith Mosman** 
Abstract: Critics widely disparage the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) for being a mere “paper tiger” or bureaucratic red-tape. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has surely encouraged this perception by treating the statute 
with consistent hostility, reducing it to a requirement only to follow prescribed 
administrative procedures but not produce any environmental results. But in the 
Ninth Circuit, NEPA lives a more important life, since that court has not 
forgotten NEPA’s essential environmental purpose. This article examines four 
lines of cases in the Ninth Circuit that may show that NEPA’s future might 
reflect its conservation purpose. These cases 1) deny NEPA plaintiffs with purely 
economic motives standing, 2) exempt from NEPA analysis designations of 
critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act because they have no physical 
effect on the environment, 3) reduce the threshold for when NEPA requires 
preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) by requiring 
environmental plaintiffs to raise only “substantial questions” about whether the 
agency proposal may produce significant environmental effects, and 4) accept a 
relaxed scope of alternatives in EISs on agency proposals that have a 
conservation purpose. We maintain that if other circuits adopted these four 
Ninth Circuit rules, NEPA would achieve the environmental protection that 
Congress envisioned from the statute four decades ago. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),1 the so-
called Magna Carta of the environment,2 suffers from a 
                                               
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006). 
2. J. Matthew Haws, Note, Analysis Paralysis: Rethinking the Court’s Role in 
Evaluating EIS Reasonable Alternatives, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 537, 540 (2012) (“Since 
President Richard Nixon signed NEPA into law on January 1, 1970, the Act has been 
described as the ‘Magna Carta’ of environmental legislation.”); Daniel R. Mandelker, 
The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its Experience and Problems, 32 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 293 (2010) (“[NEPA], the Magna Carta of environmental 
law, requires all federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their 
actions[.]”); Jean M. Emery, Comment, Environmental Impact Statements and Critical 
Habitat: Does NEPA Apply to the Designation of Critical Habitat Under the 
Endangered Species Act?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 973, 973–74 (1996) (“Hailed by some as the 
Magna Carta of environmental legislation, [NEPA] entered the American scene 
unheralded and uncontested. President Nixon and the 91st Congress viewed the bill as 
an innocuous, vague statement of idealistic vision, passing it with little debate. Yet, 
this ‘paper tiger’ turned out to have some very long teeth.”); Sam Kalen, The APA’s 
Influence on the Development of the National Environmental Policy Act, NAT. RES. & 
ENV., Spring 2009, at 3 (“When Congress passed NEPA it became touted as the Magna 
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declining reputation. Students are always disappointed to 
learn that the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that NEPA 
does not equip courts to reverse agency decisions that injure 
the environment.3 One student succinctly summed up the 
disappointment in a comment to Professor Oliver Houck on an 
Environmental Law exam: “NEPA: you can kill all the deer, so 
                                               
Carta of environmental laws, yet by 1980 the Act had become a process-oriented 
statute rather than a substantive policy governing federal agency decisions.”); Jenna 
Musselman, Comment, Safetea-Lu’s Environmental Streamlining: Missing 
Opportunities for Meaningful Reform, 33 ECOL. L.Q. 825, 856 (2006) (“As the ‘Magna 
Carta’ of U.S. environmental law, NEPA was supposed to provide an environmental 
charter that would integrate environmental values into all levels of federal agencies 
and make the environment a key concern in all federal decision-making.”). 
3. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 
(1978) (“[The purpose of NEPA] is to insure a fully informed and well-considered 
decision, not necessarily a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court 
would have reached had they been members of the decision making unit of the 
agency.”); see also James Allen, NEPA Alternatives Analysis: The Evolving Exclusion of 
Remote and Speculative Alternatives, 25 J. LAND, RES., & ENVTL. L. 287, 298 (2005) 
(“The concept of a remote and speculative alternative has become a mainstay of NEPA 
alternatives litigation, and Vermont Yankee is regularly cited for the proposition that 
such alternatives need not be considered in a NEPA analysis.”); Strycker’s Bay 
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 (1980) (“[O]nce an agency 
has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a 
court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it 
cannot ‘interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of 
the action to be taken.’” (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976))); 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (“[I]t is now 
well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply 
prescribes the necessary process.”). Note that in the first few years of NEPA litigation, 
the D.C. Circuit thought that consideration of an agency’s NEPA decision for 
procedural compliance was a substantive review, albeit one limited to the adequacy of 
the agency’s of the breadth of environmental considerations. See Calvert Cliffs’ 
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971) (“[I]f the decision was reached procedurally without individualized 
consideration and balancing of environmental factors-conducted fully and in good 
faith-it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.”); Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz, 
382 F. Supp. 362, 374–75 (D.D.C. 1974), opinion adopted in part, 539 F.2d 220 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (“In its review of the agency’s decision, the Court is obligated to consider the 
substantive decision on the merits to see if it is in accord with NEPA’s requirements… 
The Court’s review, however, is a limited one for the purpose of determining whether 
the agency reached its decision after full, good faith consideration of the 
environmental factors.”); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Callaway, 459 F. Supp. 188, 
193–94 (D.D.C. 1978) (“Most courts that have considered the issue have held that 
agency decisions to take action on projects having a significant environmental impact 
may be reviewed substantively by the courts to ensure that the decision was not 
arbitrary and capricious.”). The D.C. Circuit’s language may have implied that NEPA 
was both a substantive and a procedural law, but the Supreme Court held that judicial 
review under NEPA is procedural in Vermont Yankee: “NEPA does set forth significant 
substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially 
procedural.” 435 U.S. at 558. 
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long as you write it down.”4 
Defenders of NEPA nevertheless maintain that by requiring 
federal agencies to anticipate the adverse effects of their 
proposals in advance,5 NEPA authorizes the public and other 
agencies to participate in decision making, often uncovers 
other statutory violations, and opens up courthouse doors for 
challenges to government actions. The latter result, some 
NEPA defenders have pointed out, has created a kind of 
common law of the environment,6 since the factual context for 
NEPA cases continuously changes, enabling courts to either 
engage in “soft glance” or “hard look” review of whether agency 
                                               
4. See E-mail from Oliver A. Houck, Professor of Law, Tulane University Law 
School, to Envlawprofessors (Dec. 19, 2011, 20:15 CDT) (on file with author), referring 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 350–51 
(stating that the Forest Service could permit construction of a ski facility at Sandy 
Butte, even if it would result in a total loss of the local mule deer herd, and still be in 
compliance with NEPA). 
5. As Robert Dreher has noted, “NEPA gives effect to the common-sense axiom ‘look 
before you leap.’ The Act does not require federal agencies to choose an 
environmentally-friendly course over a less environmentally-friendly option. But, as a 
practical matter, the requirement to prepare an EIS ensures that agency decisions will 
reflect environmental values.” ROBERT G. DREHER, NEPA UNDER SIEGE: THE 
POLITICAL ASSAULT ON THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 3 (2005), available 
at http://www.arcticgas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2005-nepaundersiege.pdf. 
6. Justice Marshall noted that “[NEPA] seems designed to serve as no more than a 
catalyst for development of a ‘common law’ of NEPA. To date, the courts have 
responded in just that manner and have created such a ‘common law.’ Indeed, that 
development is the source of NEPA’s success.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 
(1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citation 
omitted); See also Jeannette MacMillan, An International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses 
in Domestic Environmental Law: NAFTA, NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks 
(Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen), 32 ECOL. L.Q. 491, 522 (2005) (“Even 
NEPA’s procedural instructions leave many holes . . . . Courts have taken this 
opportunity to create an extensive ‘common law’ of NEPA.”); Peter S. Knapman, 
Comment, A Suggested Framework for Judicial Review of Challenges to the Adequacy 
of an Environmental Impact Statement Prepared Under the Hawaii Environmental 
Policy Act, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 719, 725 (1996) (“Since NEPA was enacted there have 
been a large number of cases litigated under the statute. This has created a significant 
body of NEPA ‘common law,’ which is an important addition to the text of the statute 
and accompanying regulations.”); Celia Campbell-Mohn & John S. Applegate, 
Learning from NEPA: Guidelines for Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 93, 125 (1999) (“NEPA and its common law can serve as instructive models for 
federal risk legislation.”); David M. Shea, Note, The Project Bioshield Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: An Impetus for the Modernization of Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statements, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 695, 735 (2006) (“[W]hile there currently 
exists a vast body of NEPA common law, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to 
reduce the burdens of environmental litigation by broadcasting its preference that 
CEQ’s regulations be given substantial deference.”). 
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proposals complied with NEPA procedures.7 The results can 
give NEPA decisions an aura of unpredictability, perhaps 
suggesting that the results of the case law are more a 
consequence of the underlying merits of the agency proposal, 
the nature of the opposition, or the subjective views of the 
reviewing court. 
Without quarreling with the notion that NEPA cases are 
highly fact-specific, the fact that there is NEPA law protective 
of the environment is often overlooked. In fact, the Ninth 
Circuit has created a considerable amount of NEPA case law 
that achieves the overarching statutory goal of ensuring that 
federal actions produce “conditions under which man and 
nature can exist in productive harmony.”8 The court has 
proved unwilling to allow economic, profit-seeking interests to 
file NEPA suits9 or use NEPA to delay critical habitat 
designations under the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).10 Similarly, a plaintiff need only show that “substantial 
questions” about the effect of the action exist when claiming 
that a proposed action is “significant,” and therefore requires 
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).11 In 
                                               
7. For examples of so-called “soft glance” review, affirming the agency proposal, see 
W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1240 (D. 
Wyo. 2008), aff’d sub nom, BioDiversity Conservation Alliance v. Bureau of Land 
Mgmt., 608 F.3d 709 (10th Cir. 2010) (in a challenge to the BLM’s approval of project 
to develop thousands of coalbed methane wells in Wyoming and Montana, the district 
court stated that “the voluminous administrative record in this case, which includes 
twenty compact disks of information, belies the assertion that the BLM did not take a 
hard look at the potential environmental consequences of the proposed project.”); 
Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1994) (an 
EIS prepared prior to the Federal Highway Administration’s decision to approve a toll 
road that analyzed “all the alternatives that were feasible and briefly discusse[d] the 
reasons others were eliminated” was sufficient to comply with NEPA). “Hard look” 
review cases include Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 
2005) (Navy’s EIS in support of decision to build aircraft landing training field near a 
national wildlife refuge had “deficiencies in each area of the Navy’s analysis would not, 
on their own, be sufficient to invalidate the EIS. But a review of the various 
components of the EIS taken together indicate[d] that the Navy did not conduct the 
‘hard look’ that NEPA requires.”), and Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that cumulative impact analysis 
contained in EIS on decision to approve timber sales in national forest was 
inadequate). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006). 
9. See infra notes 19–78 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 79–115 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 116–52 and accompanying text. 
5
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addition, the appropriate range of alternatives an EIS must 
consider, the heart of an EIS,12 is less expansive concerning 
agency proposals protecting the environment than those 
harming the environment.13 
These Ninth Circuit interpretations have together created a 
body of NEPA law that favors positive environmental 
outcomes. None of them transgresses the Supreme Court’s 
proscription against courts reversing agency decisions on their 
substantive environmental merits.14 But collectively they 
make it difficult for those whose interest is in private profit, 
not ecological protection, to use NEPA for their economic 
purposes. The decisions also facilitate government actions 
protecting the environment. If other circuits widely adopted 
these Ninth Circuit rules, NEPA’s reputation as a paper tiger, 
imposing only red tape on government action,15 would 
diminish. 
Arguably, NEPA’s language in section 101, which is 
routinely ignored by the courts, aims to ensure that federal 
actions foster environmental quality.16 Section 102(1) of the 
statute, also largely overlooked by the courts, reinforces this 
notion by calling for agencies to pursue actions consistent with 
NEPA’s environmental policies.17 But until these provisions 
                                               
12. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2012). 
13. See infra notes 153–92 and accompanying text. 
14. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3. 
15. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 
25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 12 (2006) (“[The Supreme Court] must provide some 
mechanism for NEPA to be more than a ‘paper tiger.’”); William Murray Tabb, The 
Role of Controversy in NEPA: Reconciling Public Veto with Public Participation in 
Environmental Decisionmaking, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 175, 190 
(1997) (asking “[h]as NEPA become a ‘paper tiger’ after all?” and recommending a 
“comprehensive, multi-factored approach” to determining whether an action is “highly 
controversial”); see also Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy 
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that the inclusion of the phrase 
“to the fullest extent possible” in section 102 of NEPA “does not make NEPA’s 
procedural requirements somehow ‘discretionary.’ Congress did not intend the Act to 
be such a paper tiger”). 
16. “[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all 
practicable means . . . to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, 
and resources to the end that the Nation may . . . attain the widest range of beneficial 
uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other 
undesirable and unintended consequences.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (2006). 
17. “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the 
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and 
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are judicially exhumed from the statutory grave, decisions like 
those discussed in this article offer the best opportunity for the 
Magna Charta of the U.S. environment to achieve its 
protective goals. 
This article discusses four prominent Ninth Circuit rules of 
NEPA interpretation that foster federal government action to 
protect the environment. Section I explains the court’s 
decisions concerning the prudential rule that only those 
plaintiffs within “the zone of interests” of the statute have 
standing to invoke court review. Section II explores the 
requirement that agency actions triggering NEPA’s 
requirements must have a physical effect on the environment, 
not merely work a legal change protecting the environment, 
like designating critical habitat under the ESA. Section III 
discusses the burden-shifting effect that occurs when a 
plaintiff challenges an agency’s determination that a proposed 
action is not “significant” by showing that “substantial 
questions” about the effect of the proposal exist. When the 
court determines that such questions are present, the agency 
must then demonstrate that the questions raised are not 
“substantial,” or it must prepare an EIS. Section IV focuses on 
NEPA’s key requirement to analyze alternatives, which in the 
Ninth Circuit may be less expansive in the case of government 
actions that foster environmental protection than those that 
undermine it. We conclude by suggesting that these four Ninth 
Circuit rules have helped NEPA protect the Western 
environment, and if they were embraced by other circuits, 
would restore some of NEPA’s promise as articulated by a 
prescient Congress over forty years ago.18 
II. STANDING UNDER NEPA’S “ZONE OF INTERESTS”: 
EXCLUDING PECUNIARY INTERESTS 
According to Professor Doremus, standing to file suit 
“remains the most persistent constitutional quandary of 
                                               
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 
4332 (2006). 
18. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 40,924 (daily ed. Dec. 22,1969) (statement of Rep. 
Dingell) (“[T]he passage of this legislation will constitute one of the most significant 
steps ever taken in the field of conservation . . . it will offer us an opportunity to carry 
out the policies and goals set forth in the bill to provide each citizen of this great 
country a healthful environment.”). 
7
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environmental law.”19 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sierra Club v. Morton,20 a long line of Supreme Court cases—
many involving issues affecting the environment—have 
established a three-pronged test for constitutional 
standing.21 Additionally, courts have imposed a series of 
“prudential” standing requirements.22 The contours of 
prudential standing may remain imprecise,23 but plaintiffs 
alleging statutory violations must show that they are 
“arguably within the zone of interests” the statute 
                                               
19. Holly Doremus, The Persistent Problem of Standing in Environmental Law, 40 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,956 (2010). 
20. 405 U.S. 727, 737–39 (1972) (refusing to grant the Sierra Club standing to 
challenge approval of the Disney Corporation’s plan to develop a ski resort on Mineral 
King mountain, but allowing the club to amend its complaint to show that its members 
used the Mineral King environment and would suffer aesthetic injuries if that 
environment were degraded, thereby creating user-based standing for the organization 
that would satisfy the constitutional requirement of a concrete “controversy”). 
21. The three elements required to establish constitutional standing are (1) that the 
party has suffered an “injury in fact,” which is “an invasion of a judicially cognizable 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) that the injury is “fairly traceable” to actions of the 
defendant; and (3) that the injury is likely to “redressed by a favorable decision.” 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (“Over the years, our cases have established that the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the 
plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact. . . . Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . . Third . . . that the 
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” (internal citations omitted)); Maine 
People’s Alliance & Natural Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 283 
(1st Cir. 2006) (“Those requirements are expressed in a familiar three-part algorithm: 
a would-be plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury in fact, a 
causal connection that permits tracing the claimed injury to the defendant’s actions, 
and a likelihood that prevailing in the action will afford some redress for the injury.”). 
22. Concerning prudential standing, a court asks “whether the constitutional or 
statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting 
persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 500 (1975). Included among the requirements for prudential standing are that: (1) 
“when the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal 
measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant 
exercise of jurisdiction,” (2) “the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights 
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third 
parties,” and (3) that “a plaintiff’s grievance must arguably fall within the zone of 
interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee 
invoked in the suit.” Id. at 499. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 
U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982)). 
23. Doremus, supra note 19, at 10,957 (noting that the lack of precision in the 
doctrine is largely due to a “closely, but deeply, divided” Supreme Court, which has 
issued “a progression of 5-4 decisions that do not make a coherent whole”). 
8
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recognized.24 
In the case of NEPA, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted this 
prudential standing test to exclude plaintiffs whose interest in 
invoking the statute is pecuniary and unconnected to any 
legitimate environmental concerns, as claims by such plaintiffs 
are inconsistent with NEPA’s environmental purpose.25 By its 
own terms, NEPA announced a national policy to “encourage 
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his 
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and 
stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources 
important to the Nation.”26 In addition to considering a 
challenge to a plaintiff’s prudential standing, courts often 
address the purpose of NEPA.27 The Council on Environmental 
Quality’s regulations implementing the statute clarify that 
“NEPA’s purpose is not to generate paperwork—even excellent 
paperwork—but to foster excellent action.”28 As the CEQ 
                                               
24. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (first 
articulating the “zone of interests” test for statutory standing, interpreting the 
Administrative Procedure Act to grant standing to those “aggrieved by agency action 
within the meaning of a relevant statute”). 
25. See Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 473–74 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussed at 
infra notes 35–46 and accompanying text). Unlike constitutional standing, Congress 
can limit or eliminate prudential standing. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (“unlike their 
constitutional counterparts, [prudential standing requirements] can be modified or 
abrogated by Congress”). Examples of statutes that abrogate prudential standing 
include the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which states that “any person 
may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person… who is alleged to 
be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, 
or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) 
(2006); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, which contains highly similar language at 42 U.S.C. § 9659. Courts have 
confirmed that “Congress has abrogated the prudential standing requirements under 
these statutes,” see, e.g., DMJ Associates, L.L.C. v. Capasso, 288 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). NEPA also established a Council on Environmental 
Quality that promulgated regulations implementing NEPA procedures in 1978. See 40 
C.F.R. § 1500 (2012). 
27. See, e.g., Mun. of Anchorage v. United States, 980 F.2d 1320, 1329 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“The purpose of NEPA is to ensure that federal agencies consider the 
environmental impact of their actions.”); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 812 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We hold that here the [inaccurate economic 
information relied upon by the Forest Service] was sufficiently significant that it 
subverted NEPA’s purpose of providing decision makers and the public with an 
accurate assessment of the information relevant to evaluate the Tongass Plan.”). 
28. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2012) (“The NEPA process is intended to help public 
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regulations illustrate, NEPA’s purpose of environmental 
protection is advanced through the statute’s procedures, which 
require thorough analysis of environmental 
consequences.29 The Supreme Court has similarly stated that 
protection of the physical environment is NEPA’s purpose.30 
The Ninth Circuit has sometimes characterized NEPA’s 
purpose as simply informational,31 explaining that NEPA’s 
purpose requires action agencies to develop and publicly 
disclose information about the environmental consequences of 
their proposals in order to prevent unforeseen environmentally 
destructive results.32 However, the court also recognizes the 
                                               
officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental 
consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment. 
These regulations provide the direction to achieve this purpose.”). 
29. Id. (“The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that 
are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that 
protect, restore, and enhance the environment.”). 
30. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773 (1983) 
(“[A]lthough NEPA states its goals in sweeping terms of human health and welfare, 
these goals are ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means of protecting the 
physical environment”) (discussed infra notes 102–4 and accompanying text). 
31. See Columbia Basin Land Prot. Ass’n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 592 (9th Cir. 
1981) (ruling that an EIS on a Memo of Understanding between the Bureau of Land 
Management and the Bureau of Reclamation, in addition to the EIS prepared on the 
relevant action of constructing transmission lines, was not required); “The purpose of 
NEPA is to assure that federal agencies are fully aware of the present and future 
environmental impact of their decisions. Additionally, the preparation of an EIS 
ensures that other officials, Congress, and the public can evaluate the environmental 
consequences independently.” Id. (citing Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 
1974) (en banc) (determining that NEPA applies to state projects that received federal 
grants after NEPA’s passage and that NEPA documents must be made available to the 
public prior to hearings)); Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 
1988) (concluding that substantial questions about the effects of paving a road in a 
national forest required preparation of an EIS) (“An assessment must be ‘prepared 
early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the 
decision making process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already 
made.’” (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1987))). 
32. Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 557 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(deciding that the Forest Service’s decision not to prepare a supplemental EIS on 
timber sales in Nez Perce National Forest violated NEPA) (“NEPA’s purpose is to 
ensure that ‘the agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its 
decision after it is too late to correct.’” (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 
U.S. 360, 371 (1989) (holding that the Army Corps of Engineers’ decision not to 
prepare a supplemental EIS on the Elk Creek Dam in Oregon’s Rogue River Basin 
after being presented with new information was not arbitrary and capricious)); Ground 
Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 
2004) (concluding that the Navy was not required to complete NEPA analysis for 
submarine base missile deployment decisions) (“NEPA’s purpose is to ensure that 
federal agencies take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences before committing to 
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broader purpose of NEPA to protect the environment33 and 
generally approaches the Act with this purpose in mind. 
Consequently, those who seek to protect the environment for 
their own use and enjoyment are clearly within the zone of 
interests that NEPA aimed to protect, and therefore they may 
invoke its procedures in court.34 But those who seek to enforce 
NEPA purely for profit fall outside the statute’s zone of 
interests under a longstanding Ninth Circuit rule.35 
A. Excluding Purely Pecuniary Interests from NEPA’s Zone of 
Interest 
The Ninth Circuit’s prudential standing interpretation is 
quite venerable, originating in the 1979 decision of Port of 
Astoria v. Hodel, where the Port, along with a broadcasting 
company, a citizens group, and five individuals all challenged a 
proposed power sale contract between the federal Bonneville 
                                               
action.” (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 
(1989)); Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of 
NEPA is to require disclosure of relevant environmental considerations that were 
given a ‘hard look’ by the agency, and thereby to permit informed public comment on 
proposed action and any choices or alternatives that might be pursued with less 
environmental harm.”); N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 
1067, 1085 (9th Cir. 2011) (“NEPA aims (1) to ensure that agencies carefully consider 
information about significant environmental impacts and (2) to guarantee relevant 
information is available to the public.”). 
33. See, e.g., Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he overarching purpose of [NEPA is] environmental protection.”) (discussed 
further infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l 
Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1185 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling that agency’s 
decision not to prepare an EIS on the corporate average fuel economy standards for 
light trucks was “markedly deficient,” and remanding to the agency for preparation of 
revised analysis) (“NEPA ‘is our basic national charter for protection of the 
environment.’” (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2006))); Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 
657 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 1981) (“The legislative history also indicates the purpose of 
NEPA was to provide a mechanism to enhance or improve the environment and 
prevent further irreparable damage.”) (discussed further infra notes 85–89 and 
accompanying text). 
34. See, e.g., Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The 
birdwatchers’ interest in preserving the historic buildings and natural environment of 
the Naval Station and preventing adverse environmental effects from its proposed 
reuse falls squarely within the zone of interests protected by NEPA.”); City of Las 
Vegas, Nev. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 570 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he city 
alleges a concrete injury to its interests in the environment and in safety which falls 
within the zone of interests of NEPA.”). 
35. See infra notes 36–78 and accompanying text. 
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Power Administration (BPA) and an aluminum plant.36 The 
original proposal would have located the plant near Astoria, 
along the Columbia River near the Oregon coast, but BPA 
changed the location to a site nearly three hundred miles 
upriver in Umatilla County, Oregon.37 Disappointed at this 
relocation, the Port and the others filed suit, claiming that 
BPA violated NEPA by failing to prepare an environmental 
impact statement on the contract, the plant itself, and 
associated facilities.38 
The district court agreed that the contract required an EIS 
but refused to invalidate it, ruling instead that the contract 
was unenforceable without an EIS.39 The lower court also 
concluded that the Port lacked standing to challenge BPA’s 
proposal under NEPA because the Port’s sole concern was its 
economic injury,40 although the court upheld the standing of 
the other plaintiffs.41 All of the plaintiffs appealed, seeking 
invalidation of the contract. The Port also challenged the lower 
court’s ruling denying its standing.42 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the standing issue, deciding 
                                               
36. 595 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1979). 
37. See id. 
38. The proposal included not only supplying BPA electricity to the plant, but also 
the construction of federal transmission lines. Id. Moreover, the power sale contract 
actually began the implementation of BPA’s Hydro-Thermal Power Program, under 
which BPA promised to help finance some twenty-six new thermal (coal and nuclear) 
power plants through power sale contracts like this one. See id. at 477–78. The 
connection of the power contract to this program would prove to be its undoing, as the 
plant was never constructed. See infra note 47. 
39. Port of Astoria v. Hodel, [1975] 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20,657 (D. Or. 
Aug. 26,1975). 
40. Id. at 20,658. (“Economic and environmental interests must be linked under the 
NEPA zone of interest. I find the Port, despite allegations to the contrary, is solely 
concerned with its pecuniary interest.”). 
41. Id. The court concluded that members of the citizen’s group and the individuals 
had standing because they “live, work, and/or spend leisure time in Umatilla County.” 
The broadcast company had standing because the action threatened to interfere with 
its signal and injure its “corporate health.” The court’s distinction between the 
broadcast company’s standing and the Port’s lack of standing seemed premised on the 
fact that the former’s existing business would be adversely affected by the 
environmental effects of the aluminum plant, while the latter’s potential business 
expectations were frustrated by the lack of environmental effects, as the plant avoided 
its neighborhood. 
42. Id. The district court stated that “the Port, despite allegations to the contrary, is 
solely concerned with its pecuniary interest . . . The Port of Astoria lacks standing to 
bring this action.” 
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that the Port’s alleged economic losses due to the relocation of 
the plant were insufficient to support NEPA standing. The 
court observed that “these alleged injuries represent only 
pecuniary losses and frustrated financial expectations that are 
not coupled with environmental considerations . . . . 
Consequently, the alleged injuries are outside of NEPA’s zone 
of interest and are not sufficient to establish standing.”43 The 
court drew support for its position from decisions in the 
District of Columbia, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits.44 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the standing of the other 
plaintiffs, including the broadcasting company whose alleged 
injuries concerned potential damage to its broadcast signal 
from the power lines required by the plant.45 The court 
acknowledged that the broadcaster’s injury “may be classified 
as economic.” However, the court determined that the alleged 
injury resulted directly from the environmental effects of 
building the plant and therefore was “an act that lies within 
NEPA’s embrace.”46 The court then considered the merits of 
the case and affirmed the district court’s decision that the 
contract was unenforceable prior to BPA’s preparation of an 
EIS on the construction of the plant.47 
                                               
43. Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 475. 
44. Id. (citing Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(upholding standing of property owner challenging new federal building construction 
that would house federal offices currently in property holder’s buildings, but 
recognizing that “an allegation of injury to monetary interest alone may not bring a 
party within the zone of environmental interests as contemplated by NEPA for the 
purposes of standing”)); Clinton Cmty. Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Med. Ctr., 374 F. 
Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1974), aff’d, 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 
1048 (1975) (denying standing to hospital operators challenging construction of 
competing hospital); Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422, 424–25 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(granting standing to property owners whose property was to be condemned for a 
development because “their environmental concerns are not so insignificant that they 
ought to be disregarded altogether.”)). The Port also argued that it should have NEPA 
standing because it had pollution control authority under the state’s statute defining 
the authority of ports over harbors (OR. REV. STAT. § 777.120(2)), citing NEPA’s 
language of involving local agencies in its processes. Port of Astoria, at 475 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1969)). But the court rejected this argument, noting that the 
Port’s minor environmental protection role was entirely discretionary. Id. at 475–76. 
45. Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 476. The citizens group and the individual plaintiffs 
living in the vicinity of the proposed plant successfully argued that they would suffer 
“ecological and aesthetic injuries” from the physical presence of the plant. Id. 
46. Id. (“[T]he injury is the immediate and direct result of the building of the 
Alumax plant, an action that ‘will have a primary impact on the natural 
environment.’”). 
47. Id. at 479–80. In related litigation, environmentalists successfully argued that 
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B. The Influence of Port of Astoria in the Ninth Circuit 
The Port of Astoria rule—denying NEPA standing to those 
with only pecuniary interests unconnected to legitimate 
environmental concerns—has been Ninth Circuit law for over 
thirty years. The rule has been applied in a number of ensuing 
cases. For example, in Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest 
Service, the court held that an organization of ranchers with 
permits to graze on federal lands lacked standing to challenge 
the Forest Service’s Land and Resource Management Plan for 
the Toiyabe National Forest.48 The Ninth Circuit noted that 
the organization “cannot invoke NEPA to prevent ‘lifestyle 
loss’ when the lifestyle in question is damaging to the 
environment.”49 A similar outcome occurred when an electric 
utility challenged an EIS prepared by the Forest Service for 
the approval of an oil pipeline likely to interfere with the 
utility’s electricity transmission in City of Los Angeles v. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.50 The Central District of California 
ruled that the utility lacked standing because its primarily 
economic claims conflicted with the public interest in the 
environment, and therefore were likely to frustrate the 
purposes of NEPA.51 
In Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United 
Stockgrowers of America v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, a 
group of cattle producers challenged a rule that allowed 
                                               
the program of which the proposed aluminum plant power-supply contract was a part 
also required an EIS. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590 (D. Or. 
1977), aff’d, 626 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1980) (requiring that BPA prepare an EIS on its 
Hydro-Thermal Power Program, which envisioned twenty-six new coal and nuclear 
plants); BPA thus could not implement the power contract for the proposed aluminum 
plant without completing this program EIS. It took BPA several years to complete the 
EIS, and by the time the agency did, the proponents of the plant scrapped it, and the 
plant was never built. See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest’s Hydroelectric 
Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 
WASH. L. REV. 175, 226–27 (1983). The litigation was ultimately held to be moot, 
following adoption of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation 
Act (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839–839h). Natural Res. Def. Council v. Munro, 520 F. 
Supp. 17 (D. Or. 1981). 
48. 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993). 
49. Id. at 716. 
50. 950 F. Supp. 1005 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
51. Id. at 1012–14. The court explained that NEPA advances “a general public 
interest in the environment,” and that the utility’s “economic interests are of such 
magnitude as to render” the claims in conflict with NEPA. Id. at 1013. 
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resumption of Canadian beef imports under NEPA.52 The 
Ninth Circuit noted that the cattle producers had alleged only 
economic harms and a vague concern for human health and 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or “mad cow disease” 
contamination.53 The court concluded that concerns about food-
borne illnesses were outside the scope of NEPA,54 and 
consequently the cattlemen lacked standing under NEPA 
because they had “no claimed or apparent environmental 
interest,” and were therefore outside NEPA’s zone of interest.55 
These decisions, among others,56 retained the rationale of 
Port of Astoria. The Ninth Circuit viewed NEPA as a means to 
advance environmental protection, not economic 
interests.57 This view remained unchallenged until the Eighth 
Circuit took a contrary position in 1999.58 
                                               
52. 415 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005). 
53. Id. at 1103 (“R-CALF points to only one paragraph in its complaint to justify its 
standing under NEPA. Every allegation in this paragraph, however, concerns the 
economic interest of R-CALF members except the following: ‘R-CALF USA members 
will also be adversely affected by the increased risk of disease they face when 
Canadian beef enters the U.S. meat supply.’”). 
54. Id. (“R-CALF’s claimed interest, however, has no connection to the physical 
environment; rather, it is solely a matter of human health.”). 
55. Id. at 1103–04 (citing Town of Stratford, Conn. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 285 
F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
56. Other Ninth Circuit decisions following the Port of Astoria rule include W. Radio 
Services Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1996) (telecommunications company lacked 
standing to challenge Forest Service’s decision to issue a special-use permit for a 
competitor to relocate their radio tower facility in the Ochoco National Forest under 
NEPA. The court noting that the plaintiffs admitted that their “sole complaint was 
alleged interference, which we have held is purely economic” Id. at 903); Arizona 
Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Cartwright, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1109 (D. Ariz. 1998) 
(ranchers challenging adoption of regional grazing management standards by the 
Forest Service “must allege an environmental injury to have standing under NEPA.” 
denied standing under NEPA); Kingman Reef Atoll Investments, L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Interior, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Haw. 2002) (denying standing to plaintiffs 
claiming ownership of a reef over which the Department of Interior had established a 
National Wildlife Refuge because “[t]here is no evidence that Plaintiffs have any 
environmental or conservation interest in Kingman Reef, or that preserving the 
environment is part of their mission.” Id. at 1185–86). 
57. “The purpose of NEPA is to protect the environment, not the economic interests 
of those adversely affected by agency decisions.” Nev. Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Hodel, 866 
F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989) (abrogated on other grounds, Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
58. Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
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C. Reaffirming the Port of Astoria Rule After its Rejection by 
the Eighth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit adhered to the reasoning of Port of 
Astoria despite Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness v. 
Dombeck,59 a contrary 1999 decision of the Eighth Circuit. In 
Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness, the Eighth Circuit 
held that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bennett v. 
Spear,60 NEPA’s zone of interests included economic interests, 
at least where the challenge concerned the economic analysis 
of an EIS.61 The Eighth Circuit granted standing to a group of 
plaintiffs consisting of counties, outfitters, and concerned 
citizens who filed the challenge because the EIS in question 
included analysis of the economic implications of the 
considered alternatives.62 In Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. 
Norton, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its rule that purely 
economic interests may not use NEPA to challenge federal 
proposals, expressly rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in 
Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness.63 
In Ashley Creek, a private landowner challenged a Bureau of 
Land Management EIS on a federal permit to Agrium Conda 
Phosphate Operations, a phosphate miner and fertilizer 
manufacturer whose mine was near the habitat of Canada 
lynx, an ESA-listed species.64 The landowner maintained that 
the EIS failed to consider the alternative of purchasing the 
fertilizer from the landowner’s private lands containing 
phosphate deposits.65 The fertilizer manufacturer had 
                                               
59. Id. 
60. 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (granting standing to irrigators challenging a biological 
opinion under the Endangered Species Act). 
61. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were within NEPA’s zone of interest 
because one of the “explicit policies of NEPA” is to “fulfill the social, economic, and 
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans,” and the plaintiffs’ 
challenge to the validity of the data relied upon by the agency furthered that policy. 
Friends of Boundary Waters Wilderness, 164 F.3d at 1126 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) 
(1969)). 
62. Id. 
63. 420 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2005). 
64. See id. at 936. 
65. See id. (“Ashley Creek submitted a letter commenting that the draft EIS was 
deficient because it did not consider as an alternative the possibility of mining the 
Vernal deposits that Ashley Creek controls. Ashley Creek wrote that the Vernal 
deposits were not only cost-effective, but were also environmentally superior to the 
proposed action.”). 
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previously rejected this alternative as cost-prohibitive because 
the site was not prepared for mining operations.66 The district 
court dismissed the landowner’s NEPA claim because the 
alleged injury was purely economic, and thus outside the 
statute’s zone of interests.67 
The landowner appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on 
both constitutional and prudential standing grounds.68 
Concerning the latter, the landowner argued that the Ninth 
Circuit should adopt the Eighth Circuit’s approach, allowing 
purely economic challenges to an EIS because of the 
requirement that an EIS consider “long-term productivity” 
encompassed pecuniary interests within NEPA’s zone of 
interest.69 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the landowner’s argument that it 
should interpret the specific requirements for the kinds of 
analysis in an EIS separately from the statute’s overarching 
environmental goal.70 The court explained that “we disagree 
with our sister circuit that [section] 102 protects purely 
economic interests or that it can be severed from NEPA’s 
overarching [environmental] purpose.”71 The court also noted 
that the landowner never even presented a pretense of 
environmental concern.72 Thus, the Ashley Creek court 
reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit’s fidelity to the Port of Astoria 
                                               
66. See id. 
67. Id. at 937. 
68. The Ninth Circuit stated that: “We have long described the zone of interests that 
NEPA protects as being environmental.” Id. at 940. On the constitutional standing 
issue, the court ruled that the landowner, located some 250 miles from the proposed 
mining on federal lands, lacked a “geographic nexus” necessary to show a concrete 
injury in the case, and therefore lacked Article III standing. Id. at 938. 
69. See id. at 940–41 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1969) (requiring that an EIS 
consider “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse 
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term 
uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented”)). 
70. Id. at 944–45 (“In contrast to the ESA, under which the substantive goals of an 
individual provision may have a more specific objective than the overarching goal of 
the statute and may be analyzed independently, § 102 of NEPA cannot be separated 
from the statute’s overarching purpose of environmental protection because it is 
designed to further that purpose.”). 
71. Id. at 942. 
72. Id. 
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precedent and reiterated its rule that a pecuniary concern is 
not a sufficient basis to challenge a federal proposal under 
NEPA.73 
D. The Effect of the Ninth Circuit’s “Zone of Interests” NEPA 
Rule 
Ashley Creek’s affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s three-
decade old Port of Astoria rule reflects a judicial commitment 
to NEPA’s purpose of environmental protection.74 The 
Supreme Court may or may not share the Ninth Circuit’s view 
of NEPA,75 but the Ninth Circuit’s position reflects the purpose 
                                               
73. Id. at 945 (“In light of the purpose of § 102(2)(C)—protection of the 
environment—and the specific statutory requirements for the content of an EIS, we 
hold that a purely economic injury that is not intertwined with an environmental 
interest does not fall within § 102’s zone of interests.”). 
74. Courts in the Ninth Circuit continue to follow this rule. See Am. Indep. Mines & 
Minerals Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1251 (D. Idaho 2010) 
(denying standing to mining companies challenging a Forest Service EIS on its “travel 
management rule,” which required the Service to designate certain roads open for 
motor vehicles, and prohibited vehicle use on any other roads or off-road, because they 
had “not linked their pecuniary interest in mineral resource development to the 
physical environment or to an environmental interest contemplated by NEPA”); W. 
Radio Servs. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 08-6359-HO, 2010 WL 1169794, at *6 (D. Or. 
2010) (telecommunications company and its owner lacked standing to challenge Forest 
Service’s decision to allow BPA to construct a telecommunications facility in the 
Deschutes National Forest because the plaintiffs’ interests did “not appear to fall into 
either the NFMA or NEPA zones of interest”). 
75. See Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. 
Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507 
(2012) (arguing that the government’s “perfect” NEPA record in the Supreme Court is 
more nuanced and the Court is less consistently hostile to the statute than is generally 
appreciated; the poor record of plaintiffs is due in large measure to the persuasiveness 
of the U.S. Solicitor General and the influence of former Chief Justice Rehnquist); 
Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion Before and Within the Supreme Court: 
Reflections on NEPA’s Zero for Seventeen Record at the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 231, 236 (2012) (“The basic statistics are striking: in the seventeen NEPA cases 
the Supreme Court has decided on the merits, the federal government has won every 
single one. In none of those cases were environmental groups the petitioner, for in all 
seventeen, the environmentalist plaintiffs had won below and therefore had 
everything to lose before the Court. And, that is exactly what they did: lose. 
Amazingly, from 1976 until the Court decided Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. in November 2008, environmentalists lost all their cases unanimously, 
without obtaining a single vote of a single Justice.”); David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme 
Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanations for a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 
551, 553 (1990) (“The Supreme Court has never decided a case, or for that matter a 
single issue in a case, in favor of a NEPA plaintiff.”); Jeannette MacMillan, Note, An 
International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses in Domestic Environmental Law: NAFTA, 
NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks (Department of Transportation v. Public 
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of the statute as described by Congress: to establish a national 
policy to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony 
between man and his environment.”76 Although the statute is 
primarily procedural in nature, it is clear that Congress 
intended for federal agencies to use NEPA for environmental 
preservation and restoration.77 
Without an emphasis on the environmental purpose of 
NEPA, the statute could be employed—as it may now be in the 
Eighth Circuit—by economic interests to obstruct federal 
proposals that are inconsistent with their profit-seeking 
motives. Congress had no intention of protecting such interests 
when it enacted NEPA.78 In the Ninth Circuit, this sort of 
obstructionism has not been possible, which has prevented the 
nation’s chief generic commitment to the environment from 
becoming an obstacle available to economic interests. 
III. GIVING LEGAL PROTECTION TO THE EXISTING 
ENVIRONMENT: AN INSUFFICIENT NEPA TRIGGER 
The contentious fight in the Pacific Northwest over the 
listing of the northern spotted owl under the ESA produced 
considerable litigation.79 After the listing, the district court for 
                                               
Citizen), 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 491, 521 (2005) (“After a few years of generous 
interpretation by the lower courts, the Supreme Court began deciding against NEPA 
plaintiffs. Because courts are the major enforcers of NEPA’s environmental mandate, 
judicial hostility to expansive readings of NEPA has doomed a substantive role for the 
statute.”); Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 
25 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 10 (2006) (“the goals of NEPA have had difficulty gaining 
substantive enforcement by the United States Supreme Court”). 
76. 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2006). 
77. See supra note 27; 115 CONG. REC. 40,417 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969) (statement of 
Sen. Jackson) (“The needs and the aspirations of future generations make it our duty 
to build a sound and operable foundation of national objectives for the management of 
our resources for our children and their children. The future of succeeding generations 
in this country is in our hands. It will be shaped by the choices we make. We will not, 
and they cannot escape the consequences of our choices.”). 
78. See 115 CONG. REC. 40,925 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969) (statement of Rep. 
Mailliard) (“This legislation stands as a commitment of the Federal Government to the 
American people that the quality of life in this country in terms of its basic 
environmental components will be restored and maintained for our own benefit and 
that of succeeding generations of succeeding generations of Americans.”). 
79. For a history of the spotted owl listing, see Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests, 
Spotted Owls, and Modern Public Land Law, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605 (1990); 
Alyson C. Flournoy, Beyond the “Spotted Owl Problem”: Learning from the Old-Growth 
Controversy, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 261 (1993); Victor M. Sher, Travels with Strix: 
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the Western District of Washington ordered the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) to designate critical habitat for the 
species.80 Several counties challenged the failure to apply 
NEPA procedures to the critical habitat designation in court. 
A. NEPA and Preserving the Status Quo 
In Douglas County v. Lujan, two Oregon counties challenged 
the procedure used to designate critical habitat for the 
Northern Spotted Owl, seeking injunctive relief.81 A previous 
court decision imposed a short timeline for the 
designation.82 In its proposed habitat designation, FWS 
decided not to prepare an environmental assessment,83 citing 
the conclusions of CEQ84 and the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit 
in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus.85 
In Pacific Legal Foundation, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that the listing of a species under the ESA did not require an 
EIS because an EIS would advance neither the purposes of the 
ESA86 nor NEPA.87 Instead, a listing made without an EIS 
                                               
The Spotted Owl’s Journey Through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 41 
(1993); Brendon Swedlow, Scientists, Judges, and Spotted Owls: Policymakers in the 
Pacific Northwest, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187 (2003). 
80. N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 629 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
81. 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1472 (D. Or. 1992). The court considered a challenge to the 
county’s standing as purely economic; it decided that the county’s claims were within 
NEPA’s zone of interest as it has “an environmental interest in managing the fish and 
wildlife within its boundaries.” Id. at 1476–77. 
82. The Western District of Washington had given FWS less than three months to 
publish a proposed rule. N. Spotted Owl, 758 F. Supp. at 629–30. 
83. Proposed Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 56 
Fed. Reg. 20,816, 20,824 (May 6, 1991) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
84. In announcing the new policy, FWS stated that it had accepted “CEQ’s judgment 
that Section 4 listing actions are exempt from NEPA review ‘as a matter of law.’” 
Notice Regarding Preparation of Environmental Assessments for Listing Actions 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (Oct. 25, 1983) (to be codified 
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The court noted that the CEQ is charged with administering 
NEPA, and thus CEQ’s “interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference.” 
Douglas Cnty. v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1474 (1992) (quoting Andrus v. Sierra 
Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979)). 
85. 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981). 
86. The court stated that the purposes of the ESA “are to provide a means whereby 
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved, to provide a program for conservation, and to achieve the purposes of the 
treaties and conventions signed with foreign countries to conserve various species.” Id. 
at 835. 
87. According to the court, “NEPA is primarily a procedural statute to insure that 
 
20
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss2/1
2012] NEPA IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 213 
would further NEPA’s purpose to protect the environment 
from irreparable damage.88 Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that requiring an EIS under NEPA to make a listing decision 
under the ESA would be inconsistent with the purposes of both 
statutes.89 
In Douglas County v. Lujan, the district court rejected the 
reasoning of Pacific Legal Foundation, distinguishing the 
listing of a species under the ESA from the designation of 
critical habitat under the ESA. The court concluded that 
because FWS has more discretion when considering the 
designation of critical habitat, prior NEPA analysis would 
improve the agency’s ultimate decision and would not conflict 
with the requirements of the ESA.90 
FWS had argued that, even without an EIS, designating 
critical habitat advances the policy goals of NEPA.91 But Ninth 
Circuit case law holds that Congress intended NEPA to inform 
both the government and the public of the likely 
environmental effects of agency actions.92 Therefore, the 
district court reasoned, even an action maintaining the 
environmental status quo requires NEPA analysis to 
                                               
an agency considers the environmental impact. The impact statement is evidence that 
environmental concerns were considered by the agency.” Id. at 836. 
88. Id. at 835–37. The court stated that “[t]he purposes of NEPA are to declare a 
national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man 
and his environment; to promote prevention or elimination of damage to the 
environment and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the 
understanding of ecological systems and natural resources; and to establish a Council 
on Environmental Quality . . . . The legislative history also indicates the purpose of 
NEPA was to provide a mechanism to enhance or improve the environment and 
prevent further irreparable damage.” Id. at 837. 
89. The court reasoned that “[t]o require EPA to file an impact statement [for 
actions taken under the Clean Air Act] would only hinder its efforts at attaining the 
goal of improving the environment. That same rationale applies to actions of the 
Secretary of the Interior when he lists species as endangered or threatened in such 
action, the Secretary is charged solely with protecting the environment.” Id. 
90. Douglas Cnty. v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1479 (1992). FWS argued that when 
designating critical habitat, as in a listing decision, the agency lacked discretion to 
consider many of the factors weighed in a NEPA analysis. In response, the court 
focused on the ESA’s language allowing FWS to consider “economic impact and any 
other relevant impact” when establishing critical habitat. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 
1533(b)(2) (2006)). 
91. Id. at 1481. 
92. Id. (referring to Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(ruling that the EIS on the construction of Teton dam and reservoir contained 
adequately detailed analysis of the alternatives and cost-benefit considerations, and 
was properly limited to just the first phase of construction). 
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determine and disclose the likely environmental 
consequences.93 Consequently, the court enjoined the critical 
habitat designation pending NEPA analysis.94 
B. Exempting Critical Habitat Designations From NEPA 
In Douglas County v. Babbitt,95 the FWS appealed the 
injunction granted by the district court,96 contending that the 
county lacked standing, and that the lower court erred by 
concluding that NEPA applied to critical habitat 
designations.97 Additionally, Headwaters, an environmental 
intervener, contended that the environment would be fully 
protected without an EIS.98 
The Ninth Circuit compared the case to Merrell v. Thomas,99 
which decided that NEPA analysis was not required when the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registered pesticides 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA).100 The court concluded that, as in Merrell, 
congressional inaction ratified the FWS’s policy that NEPA did 
not apply to critical habitat designations.101 
                                               
93. Id. at 1481–82. The court noted that “while some cases have indicated that 
agencies whose mission it is to protect the environment are exempt from NEPA 
requirements, the Ninth Circuit has applied this rule very narrowly.” Id. at 1481 
(referring to Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976) 
(holding that all agencies must comply with NEPA’s requirements unless there is a 
clear and unavoidable statutory conflict)). 
94. Id. at 1485. 
95. 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995). The incoming Clinton Administration, with Bruce 
Babbitt as Secretary of the Interior, continued to defend the critical habitat 
designation made under the previous administration of George H.W. Bush; thus, the 
change of party name in the Ninth Circuit. 
96. Id. at 1497. 
97. Id. at 1499. 
98. Id. The interveners claimed that “an EIS is not required because the federal 
action at issue does not change the natural, physical environment.” According to this 
argument, the designation of critical habitat was not a “major action significantly 
affecting the human environment,” and therefore did not implicate NEPA. Id. at 1497. 
99. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986). 
100. Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d at 1502. EPA maintained that actions under 
FIFRA were not subject to NEPA procedures, due to the similarity of procedures. Since 
Congress did not, in subsequent revisions of FIFRA, require EPA to change policy, the 
Merrell court held that this lack of action indicated that Congress did not intend both 
statutes to apply to EPA pesticide registrations. Merrell, 807 F.2d at 781. 
101. Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1503. Congress amended the ESA after the Pacific 
Legal Foundation decision—and after publication of official notice from the Secretary 
that NEPA analysis would not be made for critical habitat designations—without 
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The Douglas County Ninth Circuit panel proceeded to 
discuss the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Metropolitan 
Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, in which the 
Court ruled that NEPA did not require the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission to consider the psychological health effects likely 
to be caused by restarting an undamaged reactor at the site of 
the Three Mile Island incident.102 The Supreme Court stated 
that while the broad language in NEPA’s statement of policy 
refers to “human health and welfare,” the specific goal of 
NEPA is to protect the existing environment, and any 
resulting benefits to human health are the consequence of that 
purpose.103 Thus, according to the Court, the agency had no 
duty to consider the psychological impacts of restarting the 
nuclear reactor because the “risk of an accident is not an effect 
on the physical environment.”104 According to the decision, 
only federal actions adversely and directly affecting the 
existing physical environment trigger NEPA. The court relied 
on the Supreme Court’s reasoning to conclude that “an EIS is 
unnecessary when the action at issue does not alter the 
natural, untouched physical environment at all.”105 The Ninth 
Circuit consequently disagreed with the district court’s 
reasoning that inevitable natural changes would trigger 
NEPA, holding that actions creating legal protections for an 
undisturbed environment do not require NEPA analysis.106 
Reversing the lower court, the Ninth Circuit stated that it 
would not allow NEPA to be used as an “obstructionist tactic” 
                                               
acting to change the Department of Interior’s policy. Id. at 1503–04. Additionally, the 
court determined that the ESA “displaces NEPA’s procedural and informational 
requirements.” Id. at 1503. 
102. 460 U.S. 766 (1983). 
103. Id. at 773 (“although NEPA states its goals in sweeping terms of human health 
and welfare, these goals are ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means of 
protecting the physical environment”)). 
104. Id. at 775. The Court added that “[w]e believe that the element of risk 
lengthens the causal chain beyond the reach of NEPA.” Id. 
105. Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d at 1505. 
106. The court stated, “[W]hen a federal agency takes an action that prevents 
human interference with the environment, it need not prepare an EIS.” Id. at 1506. 
Returning to the reasoning in Pacific Legal Foundation that was rejected by the 
district court, the Ninth Circuit decided that since designation of critical habitat 
furthered the purpose of NEPA, requiring an EIS would hinder that purpose. Id. 
Reviewing Pacific Legal Foundation, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the Sixth 
Circuit’s reasoning applied to the critical habitat designation for the northern spotted 
owl. Id. at 1507. 
23
Blumm and Mosman: The Overlooked Role of the National Environmental Policy Act in P
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
216 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:2 
to prevent environmental protection.107 As in the Port of 
Astoria decision,108 this result has the effect of simultaneously 
limiting NEPA’s scope while strengthening its core mission. By 
determining that NEPA analysis need not be performed on 
critical habitat designation, the Ninth Circuit denied 
challengers a cause of action that could interfere with 
designation of critical habitat under the ESA. 
C. The Effect of Not Requiring NEPA Analysis for Protecting 
the Existing Environment 
The Ninth Circuit continues to follow the holding of Douglas 
County that NEPA analysis is not required for critical habitat 
designation under the ESA.109 The rule that actions which 
merely preserve the environmental status quo do not require 
NEPA analysis also has been applied by courts outside the 
Ninth Circuit, but not consistently.110 For example, the Tenth 
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a case involving the 
designation of critical habitat for the spikedace and loach 
                                               
107. Id. at 1508. The court noted that the concern over use of NEPA to obstruct 
environmental protection was first stated by the Sixth Circuit in Pacific Legal 
Foundation, adding that “[t]his conclusion is as consistent with legal precedent as it is 
with sound policy.” Id. 
108. See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text. One peer reviewer noted that 
court’s result—exempting actions giving legal protection to the existing environment 
from NEPA analysis—does not necessarily ensure an environmental result. For 
example, if the Fish and Wildlife Service gave legal protection in the form of critical 
habitat designation only to a portion of the area necessary for spotted owl survival and 
recovery, that decision would be shielded from NEPA review. 
109. See Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, No. CV05-1128-JCC, 2007 WL 1730090, at *13 
(W.D. Wash. June 13, 2007) (holding that the promulgation of the National Marine 
Fisheries Service’s “evolutionary significant unit” policy, concerning how hatchery fish 
should figure into listing decisions under the ESA, did not require the Service to 
prepare an EIS because “the Court is persuaded that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Douglas County that the ESA procedures have displaced those in NEPA is equally 
applicable to the present case”). 
110. See American Sand Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253 
(S.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that, although superseded by a subsequently prepared EIS, 
the Bureau of Land Management could temporarily close areas to off-highway vehicles 
without NEPA analysis); but see Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 
1114–15 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that by adopting the “roadless rule” for areas of the 
national forests (discussed infra notes 167–83 and accompanying text), the Forest 
Service would change the environmental status quo, because active forest 
management had been practiced for decades, thus refusing to extend the logic of 
Douglas County). 
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minnow in New Mexico.111 The court concluded that requiring 
NEPA analysis only when an action would result in 
environmental harms would undermine NEPA’s purpose, 
which the court defined as ensuring that public officials make 
choices informed by full knowledge of an action’s 
environmental consequences.112 
Similarly, the District of Columbia District Court rejected 
the logic of Douglas County in a challenge to the designation of 
critical habitat for the wintering piping plover in North 
Carolina.113 The court dismissed the notion that NEPA 
analysis need not be prepared for an action that protects the 
physical environment, reasoning that NEPA concerns the 
quality of the human environment, which may be affected by 
placing restrictions on the areas designated as critical 
habitat.114 By determining that NEPA analysis is unnecessary 
for critical habitat designations, the Ninth Circuit prevented 
NEPA from being used by those who would invoke its 
procedures against the environment.115 When used as a 
                                               
111. Catron Cnty. Bd. of Com’rs, New Mexico v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 
1429, 1436 (1996) (disagreeing with the reasoning in Douglas County). 
112. Id. at 1437 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2012)). 
113. Cape Hatteras Access Preservation Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. 
Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2004). 
114. Id. at 136 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit does not contemplate how placing restrictions 
on land use which benefit a species may harm the human environment, may 
significantly affect it, by preventing or restricting certain activities.”). Recently, 
another D.C. district court, while not directly addressing the holding of Douglas 
County, rejected an argument that ESA § 4(d) rules allowing ESA “takes” of listed 
polar bears are exempt from NEPA because they went through notice and comment 
rulemaking, which cited Douglas County. In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act 
Listing and 4(d) Rule Litigation, 818 F. Supp. 2d 214, 236–37 (D.D.C. 2011).  If the 
D.C. Circuit were to affirm this position and reject the holding of Douglas County, the 
Ninth Circuit precedent could be functionally overruled, as plaintiffs are always able 
to challenge federal agency NEPA compliance in the D.C. Circuit, a result that would 
undermine the environmental protection the Ninth Circuit rule provides.  
115. One peer reviewer of this article suggested that the result in Douglas County 
was explainable by the fact that the plaintiffs in the case were really economic 
interests disguised as environmental interests wishing to see more deer and other 
species favoring logged-over areas. Thus, it is possible to see Douglas County as a 
progeny of Port of Astoria’s hostility to economic interests using NEPA for non-
environmental ends. 
Not all commentators believe that designation of critical habitat is an appropriate 
means for furthering the goals of the ESA. See Robert J. Scarpello, Note, Statutory 
Redundancy: Why Congress Should Overhaul the Endangered Species Act to Exclude 
Critical Habitat Designation, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 399 (2003) (arguing that 
critical habitat should be eliminated, as it drains resources and “serves as nothing 
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mechanism to hinder designations, NEPA consumes federal 
resources and delays agency actions protecting the 
environment. 
IV. THE “THRESHOLD” FOR AN EIS: THE 
“SIGNIFICANCE” OF A PROPOSED ACTION 
When an agency determines that a proposal is likely to 
“significantly affect[] the quality of the human environment,” 
NEPA requires the agency to prepare an EIS that fully 
analyzes the environmental consequences of its proposal.116 An 
agency often prepares an environmental assessment (EA) as 
the first step in NEPA analysis.117 Although an EA can 
determine that the agency should prepare an EIS, usually it 
justifies a finding of no significant impact (FONSI),118 which 
concludes the NEPA analysis on a proposal. Completing an 
EIS often takes years and requires resources that would 
otherwise be used elsewhere, so agencies have an incentive to 
issue a FONSI whenever possible. Environmental plaintiffs 
frequently challenge FONSIs, alleging that a proposal would 
actually produce significant environmental effects, and 
therefore requires an EIS. Thus, courts must review whether 
an agency’s “threshold” decision that a proposed action will not 
have significant effects constitutes a violation of NEPA.119 The 
Ninth Circuit’s test for this question—which it has consistently 
                                               
more than a weapon for environmentalists to block land development”); see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-803, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTORS: FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE USES BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE TO MAKE 
LISTING DECISIONS, BUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE NEEDED FOR CRITICAL HABITAT 
DESIGNATIONS 32 (2003) (GAO report to Congress claiming that “Litigation now 
dominates the [critical habitat] program, leading the Assistant Secretary for Fish and 
Wildlife and Parks in the Department of the Interior to recently declare that the 
system for designating critical habitat is ‘broken’ because it provides little 
conservation benefit while consuming significant resources”). 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
117. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2012). An EA is not necessary when the agency initially 
decides to prepare an EIS. Id. § 1501.3. The CEQ regulations require neither an EA 
nor an EIS to be prepared when an agency determines that the action falls under a 
pre-established categorical exclusion. Id. § 1508.4. 
118. Id. § 1508.9. 
119. Plaintiffs must bring NEPA challenges under the APA because NEPA lacks a 
citizen suit provision. The APA prohibits agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(2006). 
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used for nearly forty years—favors plaintiffs by putting the 
burden on the agency to show that there are no significant 
effects on the environment. The plaintiff, on the other hand, 
need only raise substantial questions about the environmental 
consequences of the proposal in order for a court to require 
preparation of an EIS. 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s “Substantial Questions” Test  
The origin of the Ninth Circuit’s rule about whether an 
agency proposal is “significant” lies in City of Davis v. 
Coleman,120 where the court ruled that an EIS is required 
when a plaintiff raises “substantial questions” about the 
“significant adverse impacts” of a project.121 The municipality 
of Davis, California challenged the construction of a freeway 
interchange planned by the Division of Highways of the 
California Department of Public Works, and funded in part by 
the Federal Highway Administration, because the federal 
agency failed to prepare an EIS.122 The district court ruled that 
the City lacked standing to bring the suit, but the Ninth 
Circuit reversed and reached the alleged NEPA violation that 
the district court avoided.123 According to the appeals court, 
the standard of review for an agency’s decision not to prepare 
an EIS requires “a plaintiff [to] ‘allege[] facts which, if true, 
show that the proposed project would materially degrade any 
aspect of environmental quality.’”124 Thus, the reviewing court 
                                               
120. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975). 
121. Id. at 673. 
122. Id. at 666. Additionally, the state agency failed to prepare an environmental 
impact report (EIR) required by the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 
(CEQA), CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 21100. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 666. 
123. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 673. The district court ruled that the city had not shown 
injury in fact, but the Ninth Circuit decided that “[t]he procedural injury implicit in 
agency failure to prepare an EIS—the creation of a risk that serious environmental 
impacts will be overlooked—is itself a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ to support standing, 
provided this injury is alleged by a plaintiff having a sufficient geographical nexus to 
the site of the challenged project that he may be expected to suffer whatever 
environmental consequences the project may have. This is a broad test, but because 
the nature and scope of environmental consequences are often highly uncertain before 
study we think it an appropriate test.” Id. at 671. 
124. Id. at 673 (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814, 817 n.5 (9th 
Cir. 1973) (upholding district court’s finding that court-ordered supplementation of the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s EIS for construction of the New Melones Dam across the 
Stanislaus River in California satisfied NEPA)). 
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must “determine whether the responsible agency has 
‘reasonably concluded’ that the project will have no significant 
adverse environmental consequences.”125 If a lead agency fails 
to address, or inadequately considers, “substantial questions” 
regarding a project’s likelihood of causing environmental 
harms,  under the Ninth Circuit’s rule, the agency must 
prepare an EIS.126 
In the Davis highway project, the proponents claimed that 
the consideration of what development, if any, would result 
from construction of the interchange was “secondary,” and 
therefore insufficient, to require environmental 
analysis.127 The court rejected that argument, stating that 
analysis of secondary effects, while difficult to prepare, is 
necessary because the purpose of an EIS is to analyze and 
evaluate all of a project’s environmental consequences.128 
Thus, because the City raised substantial questions regarding 
the environmental consequences of the project, the agency 
could not dismiss those questions without the analysis 
contained in an EIS.129 
The Ninth Circuit continues to apply the City of Davis v. 
Coleman rule. For example, in Foundation for North Amercian 
Wild Sheep v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,130 a coalition of 
environmentalists and hunters challenged the adequacy of an 
EA prepared by the United States Department of Agriculture 
                                               
125. Id. at 673 (quoting Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 
1973) (in a review of a decision as to whether the General Services Administration had 
to prepare an EIS on a building to house the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Fifth 
Circuit determined that “[s]ince [plaintiff] has raised substantial environmental issues 
concerning the proposed recommended project here, the court should proceed to 
examine and weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency to determine 
whether the agency reasonably concluded that the particular project would have no 
effects which would significantly degrade our environmental quality.”)). 
126. Id. at 673 (“[W]here substantial questions are raised as to whether a project 
will have significant adverse impacts it is hardly reasonable for an agency to conclude, 
prior to study, that an EIS is not required.”). 
127. Id. at 676. 
128. Id. at 677 (“If impact statements are to be useful, they must address the major 
environmental problems likely to be created by a project.”). 
129. Id. at 675–76 (“We think that this is precisely the kind of situation Congress 
had in mind when it enacted NEPA: substantial questions have been raised about the 
environmental consequences of federal action, and the responsible agencies should not 
be allowed to proceed with the proposed action in ignorance of what those 
consequences will be.”). 
130. 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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for the issuance of a special use permit, which would have 
allowed a mining company to repair and use a road running 
through calving grounds of desert bighorn sheep in a national 
forest.131 The agency concluded that no EIS was necessary 
after considering the effects of the road on the sheep.132 The 
district court upheld the agency’s decision, but, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, ruling that the agency’s EA lacked necessary 
analysis of the likely effects on the sheep, thus creating 
substantial questions and requiring preparation of an EIS.133 
A similar result occurred in Idaho Sporting Congress v. 
Thomas,134 where the Ninth Circuit decided that NEPA 
required the Forest Service to produce an EIS prior to selling 
timber in Targhee National Forest.135 The court held that 
environmentalists raised substantial questions about the effect 
that the timber sales would have on water quality, reversing 
the district court.136 And in Blue Mountains Biodiversity 
Project v. Blackwood,137 the Ninth Circuit determined that 
environmentalists successfully raised substantial questions 
about the effect of proposed timber salvage sales in Umatilla 
National Forest.138 The court reversed the district court and 
ruled that an EIS was necessary to evaluate both the 
individual projects and their cumulative impacts.139 
                                               
131. Id. at 1174–76. 
132. Id. at 1176. 
133. Id. at 1178–82 (determining that although faced with substantial questions 
about the project’s effects, the Department of Agriculture either “ignored or, at best, 
shunted [the questions] aside with mere conclusory statements” and that “[c]ertainly 
substantial questions are raised whether the closure of Road 2N06 for three months 
will serve to mitigate the potential harm to the sheep. Where such substantial 
questions are raised, an EIS must be prepared”). 
134. 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998). 
135. Id. at 1154 (overruled on other grounds by The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 
F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
136. Id. at 1151 (“In light of the failure to provide adequate data to the public, we 
conclude that an EIS is necessary to explore the substantial questions in respect to 
whether and what significant effects the sale may have.”). 
137. 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998). 
138. Id. at 1213–14. 
139. Id. (“The EA’s cursory and inconsistent treatment of sedimentation issues, 
alone, raises substantial questions about the project’s effects on the environment and 
the unknown risks to the area’s renowned fish populations. We do not find adequate 
support for the Forest Service’s decision in its argument that the 3,000 page 
administrative record contains supporting data. The EA contains virtually no 
references to any material in support of or in opposition to its conclusions. That is 
where the Forest Service’s defense of its position must be found.”). 
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B. Highly Uncertain Effects and the “Significance” Threshold 
Sometimes the uncertainty of the effects of a federal 
proposal can produce environmentally significant effects 
within the meaning of NEPA. For example, in Anderson v. 
Evans,140 animal conservationists challenged an EA on an 
agreement between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) and the Makah Tribal Council to allow 
the Tribe to hunt grey whales in Washington, arguing that the 
FONSI issued by NOAA failed to consider the effects of the 
hunt on the local whale population.141 The district court ruled 
for NOAA, deciding that the agency satisfied NEPA by taking 
a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of allowing 
the hunt.142 
The conservationists appealed, pointing to several of the 
factors that the CEQ regulations defined as indicating action 
“significantly” affecting the human environment, and therefore 
triggering preparation of an EIS.143 One of these factors is 
“[t]he degree to which the possible effects on the human 
environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or 
unknown risks.”144 The Ninth Circuit concluded that that “if 
there are substantial questions about the impact on the 
number of whales who frequent the Strait of Juan de Fuca and 
the northern Washington Coast, an EIS must be prepared.”145 
Consequently, the court held that the EA’s analysis failed to 
adequately consider the effect that whaling would have on the 
local whale population.146 Because the conservationists raised 
substantial questions—which the EA failed to properly 
analyze—they satisfied the CEQ standard for “significance” in 
federal actions, and the Ninth Circuit proceeded to conclude 
                                               
140. 371 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2002). 
141. Id. at 484–86; the conservationists also claimed violation of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). 
142. Id. at 486. 
143. Id. at 488; the CEQ factors are found at 40 C.F.R § 1508.27 (2012). 
144. 40 C.F.R § 1508.27(b)(5) (2012). 
145. 371 F.3d at 490. 
146. Id. at 492. The court stressed that despite the extensive analysis in the EA on 
the effect on the overall grey whale population, “[n]o one, including the government’s 
retained scientists, has a firm idea what will happen to the local whale population if 
the Tribe is allowed to hunt and kill whales pursuant to the approved quota and 
Makah Management Plan.” Id. at 490. 
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that the FONSI issued by NOAA on the proposed whaling did 
not satisfy NEPA procedures.147 
C. The Effect of the “Substantial Questions” Test: Forcing 
Agencies to Conduct More Rigorous Environmental 
Analysis 
The Ninth Circuit’s threshold rule—that a plaintiff need 
only raise substantial questions about the effect of a proposed 
action to succeed on a claim that an action requires an EIS—
favors NEPA plaintiffs and seems firmly established.148 A 
number of courts outside the Ninth Circuit have turned to the 
“substantial questions” test when confronted with challenges 
to an agency’s decision to issue a FONSI.149 For example, in 
                                               
147. Id. at 494. 
148. See, e.g., Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 865 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (substantial question as to whether construction of a dock extension would 
cause significant environmental degradation required an EIS); Makua v. Rumsfeld, 
163 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1222 (D. Haw. 2001) (finding that substantial questions existed 
about environmental effects of naval training at military reservation); Blue Mountains 
Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(environmentalists raised substantial questions about the environmental impacts of 
timber salvage sales, requiring an EIS); Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 
1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988) (substantial questions about the environmental impacts of 
timber sales required an EIS); Found. for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
681 F.2d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1982) (substantial questions about effects of road 
construction on protected big horn sheep in a national forest required an EIS); 
However, not all questions raised by plaintiffs satisfy this standard, see Bering Strait 
Citizens for Responsible Res. Dev. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 524 F.3d 938, 957 
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “concerns about air quality, biological resources, and 
water quality” were adequately addressed in the EA prepared for a mining project); 
Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“Simply because a challenger can cherry pick information and data out of the 
administrative record to support its position does not mean that a project is highly 
controversial or highly uncertain.”). 
149. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 18 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A] party 
challenging the agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS must show only that there is a 
substantial possibility that the action may have a significant impact on the 
environment, not that it clearly will have such an impact . . . . The Forest Service’s 
determination that preparation of an EIS was not necessary, based on the record 
before it, was therefore arbitrary and capricious.” (citing Found. for N. Am. Wild 
Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1177-78; Save Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 467)); Weiss v. 
Kempthorne, 683 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (“Plaintiffs indicate that 
their burden is to raise ‘substantial questions’ as to whether a project ‘may have a 
significant effect . . . . But Plaintiffs fail to meet this standard because their contention 
that the use of the contaminated mitigation parcels may have significant impacts that 
were not considered by the agencies is merely unsupported speculation. Such 
speculation is insufficient to raise a ‘substantial’ question.” (citing Anglers of the Au 
Sable v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F. Supp. 2d 812, 825 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (ruling that 
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Fund for Animals v. Norton,150 the District of Columbia 
District Court ruled that FWS violated NEPA when the agency 
issued a FONSI while granting the state of Maryland a 
depredation permit under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to kill 
up to 1500 mute swans. A group of animal protection 
organizations and individuals challenged the permit, and the 
court found substantial questions regarding the environmental 
effects of the depredation.151 
Once a NEPA plaintiff has raised substantial questions 
about the potential environmental effects of an action for 
which an agency issued a FONSI, the burden shifts to that 
agency to show that there will be no significant impact on the 
environment.152 This rule causes more analysis to be 
produced—either to show that no EIS is required or to produce 
an EIS—giving both agencies and the public more information 
about potential environmental effects before decisions are 
made. The result is that the scenario envisioned by NEPA’s 
                                               
BLM and the Forest Service impermissibly narrowed the range of alternatives for an 
EIS on exploratory oil and gas drilling)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, No. 10-1313, 
2012 WL 204494 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 2012); Choate v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 
4:07-CV-01170-WRW, 2008 WL 4833113 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 5, 2008) (“‘If substantial 
questions are raised regarding whether the proposed action may have a significant 
effect upon the human environment, a decision not to prepare an EIS is unreasonable.’ 
Said another way: when the environmental effects of a proposed action are highly 
uncertain or involve unique or unknown risk, an agency must prepare an EIS.” 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 717 (9th 
Cir. 1988)); Curry v. U.S. Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 553 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“[B]ased 
on the number of ‘intensity’ factors implicated by the Mortality II [timber harvest] 
Project, as well as the magnitude of the project, plaintiffs have raised ‘substantial 
questions’ regarding the issue of whether the Mortality II Project ‘may’ have a 
significant effect on the human environment . . . Therefore, the failure of the Forest 
Service to prepare an EIS for the Mortality II Project violated its NEPA obligations, 
and the decision of the Forest Service to approve the project was arbitrary and 
capricious.” (citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 917 F. Supp. 280 (D. Vt. 1995) 
(holding that proposals to extend road and conduct logging operations were 
“significant”))). 
150. 281 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2003). 
151. Id. at 234 (“[FWS] failed to identify the precise locations at which mute swans 
will be killed, the number of birds that will be killed at particular individual sites, or 
the environmental impacts of those killings on local communities.”). 
152. When a plaintiff alleges that a proposed project will significantly affect the 
human environment, it does not require courts to “determine whether a challenged 
project will in fact have significant effects. Rather, we are to determine whether the 
responsible agency has ‘reasonably concluded’ that the project will have no significant 
adverse environmental consequences.” City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 673 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 
1973)). 
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drafters is more likely to occur: given more information, 
agencies will make better decisions, producing better 
environmental outcomes. 
V. REDUCING THE RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES FOR 
CONSERVATION ACTIONS 
Alternatives analysis is the “heart” of an EIS.153 The 
“purpose and need statement,” a required element of each EIS, 
determines the required range of alternatives.154 Courts give 
agencies wide discretion to define a project’s purpose and 
need.155 A narrow statement of purpose and need allows an 
agency to consider only the alternatives that would accomplish 
that purpose and need,156 along with the required “no action 
                                               
153. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2012) (CEQ NEPA regulations) (“[Alternatives 
analysis] is the heart of the environmental impact statement. Based on the 
information and analysis presented in the sections on the Affected Environment (§ 
1502.15) and the Environmental Consequences (§ 1502.16), it should present the 
environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus 
sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options by the 
decisionmaker and the public.”). 
154. “The statement shall briefly specify the underlying purpose and need to which 
the agency is responding in proposing the alternatives including the proposed action.” 
40 C.F.R. § 1502.13 (2012); see City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 
F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that NEPA analysis of highway realignment 
project, including the alternatives analysis, was adequate, and explaining that “[t]he 
stated goal of a project necessarily dictates the range of ‘reasonable’ alternatives and 
an agency cannot define its objectives in unreasonably narrow terms.” See also Nat’l 
Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 1058, 1072 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“The BLM may not circumvent this proscription by adopting private interests to 
draft a narrow purpose and need statement that excludes alternatives that fail to meet 
specific private objectives, yet that was the result of the process here. The BLM 
adopted Kaiser’s interests as its own to craft a purpose and need statement so 
narrowly drawn as to foreordain approval of the land exchange.”), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1783 (U.S. 2011); Haws, supra note 2 (discussing how courts assess the adequacy of 
a purpose and need statement). 
155. Friends of Southeast’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(ruling that the purpose and need statement in an EIS on a proposed timber sale in a 
national forest was not unreasonably narrow; “[t]he preparation of [an EIS] 
necessarily calls for judgment, and that judgment is the agency’s. But the courts can, 
and should, require full, fair, bona fide compliance with NEPA” (quoting Lathan v. 
Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974) (requiring that NEPA documents be made 
available prior to public hearings))). 
156. City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an 
EIS on the Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to approve a permit for construction and 
operation of a log transfer facility on land owned by native shareholders in Alaska 
contained adequate alternatives analysis, noting that “[w]hen the purpose is to 
accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider the alternative ways by which 
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alternative.”157 However, an agency may not define a project’s 
objectives too narrowly.158 The Ninth Circuit applies a “rule of 
reason” to both an EIS’s statement of purpose and its range of 
alternatives.159 The Ninth Circuit articulated this standard in 
                                               
another thing might be achieved”). 
157. The CEQ regulations require an EIS to “[i]nclude the alternative of no action.” 
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2012). 
158. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1155; see also Simmons v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Army Corps of 
Engineers relied on a too-narrow purpose and need statement by limiting the proposed 
project to ease water shortages to two water districts to a single facility); Citizens 
Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (ruling that the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s EIS on a decision to approve an airport expansion 
in Toledo contained adequate alternatives analysis but noting that “[a]n agency may 
not define the objectives of its action in terms so unreasonably narrow that only one 
alternative from among the environmentally benign ones in the agency’s power would 
accomplish the goals of the agency’s action, and the EIS would become a foreordained 
formality”). 
159. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 1058, 
1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We evaluate an agency’s statement of purpose under a 
reasonableness standard.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (U.S. 2011); California v. 
Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Judicial review of the range of alternatives 
considered by an agency is governed by a ‘rule of reason’ that requires an agency to set 
forth only those alternatives necessary to permit a ‘reasoned choice.’” (citing Save Lake 
Wash. v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981) (ruling that supplemental EIS for 
construction of docking facilities for NOAA vessels in Lake Washington adequately 
considered “navigational risks,” opposing viewpoints, and the location selected for the 
docks))); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1973) (declaring that 
EIS for construction of a new runway at Honolulu airport adequately considered a 
reasonable range of alternatives). This “rule of reason” standard is also followed in the 
First Circuit, Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 
F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir. 1982) (“[T]he guideline adopted by EPA to limit its study of 
alternatives appears, in this case, to be consistent with the ‘rule of reason’ by which a 
court measures federal agency compliance with NEPA’s procedural requirements.”); 
the Second Circuit, Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 93 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (“[W]e agree with the district court that the discussion of alternatives in an 
EIS is governed by a ‘rule of reason.’”); the Fifth Circuit, Miss. River Basin Alliance v. 
Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2000) (“This Court is to follow the ‘rule of 
reason’ . . . . Agencies must explore and evaluate all reasonable alternatives.”); the 
Sixth Circuit, Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Kempthorne, 453 F.3d 334, 346 
(6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he agency may apply a ‘rule of reason’ in this area and discuss only 
‘reasonable’ alternatives to the proposed action”); the Eighth Circuit, Friends of 
Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1128 (8th Cir. 1999) (“We 
review the agency’s choice of which alternatives to discuss and the extent to which the 
EIS must discuss them under the ‘rule of reason.’”); the Tenth Circuit, Colo. Envtl. 
Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that alternatives 
analysis in an EIS on the potential expansion of a ski area in a national forest satisfied 
the “rule of reason”); Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297 
F.3d 1012, 1031 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Forest Service did not breach the ‘rule of 
reason’ by refusing to study in detail alternatives that would have limited the 
[proposed ski resort’s] structure’s size to between 1,600 square feet and 22,000 square 
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1982 in California v. Block, which ruled that the U.S. Forest 
Service’s EIS on its second roadless area review and evaluation 
(RARE II) program failed to consider an adequate range of 
alternatives.160 
In the RARE II EIS the Forest Service analyzed eleven 
alternatives, three “points of reference” and eight “seriously 
considered” alternatives, that each envisioned opening at least 
thirty-seven percent of roadless areas to development.161 The 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the Forest Service failed to 
adequately consider a reasonable range of alternatives striking 
a balance between development and preserving potential 
wilderness areas because it did not consider any alternative 
restricting development to a smaller percentage of the roadless 
area.162 The court stated that the absence of any alternatives 
that included development on less than one-third of the RARE 
areas was both “puzzling” and “troubling.”163 Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the 
Forest Service’s alternatives analysis in the RARE II EIS 
violated NEPA.164 
Twenty years later, roadless area management again 
provided the Ninth Circuit with an opportunity to address the 
standard for a reasonable range of alternatives. This time, the 
                                               
feet or moved the structure off-peak altogether.”); the D.C. Circuit, Theodore Roosevelt 
Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e review both an 
agency’s definition of its objectives and its selection of alternatives under the ‘rule of 
reason.’”); and has support from the Supreme Court’s statement that “inherent in 
NEPA and its implementing regulations is a ‘rule of reason,’ which ensures that 
agencies determine whether and to what extent to prepare an EIS based on the 
usefulness of any new potential information to the decisionmaking process.” Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004). 
160. 690 F.2d at 768. 
161. Id. at 765. “The Final EIS lists eleven alternatives, of which three—“all 
Wilderness,” “no Wilderness” and “no action”—were included as points of reference 
rather than as seriously considered alternatives . . . All eight of the alternatives 
seriously considered by the Forest Service assume that at least thirty-seven percent of 
the RARE II areas should be developed . . . No justification is given for this 
fundamental premise or the trade-off it reflects.” Id. at 767. 
162. Id. (“Although the RARE II Final EIS poses the question whether development 
should occur at all, it uncritically assumes that a substantial portion of the RARE II 
areas should be developed and considers only those alternatives with that end 
result.”). 
163. Id. at 768. 
164. Id. at 769 (“[W]e conclude it was unreasonable for the Forest Service to 
overlook the obvious alternative of allocating more than a third of the RARE II acreage 
to a Wilderness designation.”). 
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lawsuit concerned the Forest Service’s “roadless rule” 
promulgated late in the Clinton Administration,165 and the 
Ninth Circuit relaxed the scope of required alternatives when 
an agency proposes a conservation action, such as protecting 
roadless areas of national forests.166 
A. Requiring Analysis of All Viable Alternatives 
In Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman,167 the tribe—joined 
by timber companies, two counties, recreation groups, and 
livestock owners—challenged the “roadless rule”168 proposed 
by the Forest Service.169 Several environmental groups 
intervened as defendants. The tribe alleged that the Forest 
Service violated NEPA because its EIS did not consider a 
sufficient range of alternatives.170 Relying on the Ninth 
Circuit’s rule that an EIS lacking analysis of a “viable” 
alternative violates NEPA,171 the district court reiterated that 
NEPA requires a thorough alternatives analysis for any 
proposed resource use.172 
                                               
165. See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions: Roadless 
Area Management Under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1143 
(2004); Martin Nie, Administrative Rulemaking and Public Lands Conflict: The Forest 
Service’s Roadless Rule, 44 NAT. RES. J. 687 (2004). 
166. Id. 
167. 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Idaho 2001). 
168. The roadless rule “generally ban[s] road building subject to limited exceptions 
including the preservation of ‘reserved or outstanding rights’ or discretionary Forest 
Service construction necessary for public health and safety.” Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. 
Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting then 36 C.F.R. § 
294.12(b)(1),(3)). 
169. Kootenai Tribe, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1235–36. 
170. Id. at 1243. 
171. Id. (“[T]he existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an 
environmental impact statement inadequate.”) (quoting Citizens for a Better 
Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985) (ruling that the EIS for 
construction of transmission line across federal property within a city’s limits was 
adequate)). 
172. The court first acknowledged that the standard for determining whether the 
agency failed to consider a viable alternative was unclear. Id. (“[T]he practicalities of 
the requirement of are difficult to define.”); then the court emphasized the importance 
of thorough alternatives analysis. Id. (“NEPA requires all agencies of the Federal 
Government, to the fullest extent possible, to ‘[s]tudy, develop, and describe 
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which 
involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.’”); and 
concluded by analyzing the standard for determining if an EIS has satisfied the 
requirement to consider a reasonable range of alternatives is to consider: “(1) whether 
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The Forest Service’s EIS  considered just three alternatives, 
each of which prohibited all road construction in roadless areas 
differing in terms of restrictions imposed on timber 
harvesting.173 Because the district court saw no basis in the 
record for the limited range of alternatives the Forest Service 
evaluated, it ruled that the EIS’s range of alternatives was 
inadequate.174 Thus, according to the district court, the Forest 
Service violated NEPA by failing to consider viable 
alternatives that would have allowed some level of road 
construction, while preserving other roadless areas.175 
B. Reducing the Range of Alternatives for Conservation 
Actions 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court,176 ruling that 
when an agency undertakes an action aimed at producing 
environmental protection, an EIS’s range of alternatives need 
not be as extensive as would be required for an 
environmentally destructive project.177 The court thus reached 
                                               
the federal agency has sufficiently detailed information to make its decision in light of 
potential environmental consequences, and (2) whether the federal agency has 
provided the public with information on the environmental impact of the proposed 
action and encouraged public participation in the development of that information.” Id. 
173. The EIS also included a “no action alternative,” which “was included as a 
required point of reference rather than a seriously considered alternative.” Id. 
174. Id. at 1243–44. 
175. The court noted that “an agency need not evaluate alternatives that are 
inconsistent with policy objectives” but determined that there were available 
alternatives to consider that would fulfill the rule’s stated purpose, which was “to 
prohibit activities that pose the greatest risk to the social and ecological values of 
inventoried roadless areas.” Id. (citing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 
1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the alternatives analysis in an EIS prepared by the 
Forest Service prior to approving a forest management plan for an area including 
spotted owl habitat)). 
176. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated 
by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (eliminating the 
Ninth Circuit’s “federal defendant rule” that “categorically prohibit[ed] private parties 
and state and local governments from intervening of right on the merits of claims 
brought under [NEPA],” and abrogating previous rulings upholding the rule. 630 F. 3d 
at 1176, 1180–81).  
177. “The NEPA alternatives requirement must be interpreted less stringently 
when the proposed agency action has a primary and central purpose to conserve and 
protect the natural environment, rather than to harm it.” Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 
1120; The court added that “[c]ertainly, it was not the original purpose of Congress in 
NEPA that government agencies in advancing conservation of the environment must 
consider alternatives less restrictive of developmental interests.” Id. 
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a conclusion similar to Douglas County: NEPA requires less 
analysis for conservation actions.178 
The Kootenai Tribe court acknowledged that the roadless 
rule EIS lacked alternatives allowing road building.179 
However, alternatives allowing road construction as a part of a 
“roadless rule” were entirely contrary to the action’s purpose of 
protecting the roadless areas.180 As a result, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the Forest Service’s EIS as complying with NEPA 
because it concluded that the Forest Service’s stated objective 
of protecting roadless areas in national forests from 
environmental damage was a reasonable one.181 
The court decided that NEPA does not require the Forest 
Service to analyze environmentally destructive alternatives 
when planning a conservation action because NEPA’s purpose 
is not served by delaying environmentally protective actions or 
requiring lengthy analysis of alternative actions that are 
inconsistent with the Agency’s conservation 
goals.182 Consequently, the district court erred because the 
Forest Service properly limited the range of alternatives in its 
EIS to those that would advance the Agency’s protection of the 
                                               
178. Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), discussed supra notes 
96–108 and accompanying text. 
179. Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1120. 
180. Id. at 1120–21. The Ninth Circuit emphasized the many benefits of the 
roadless rule, including the fact that “unspoiled forest provides not only sheltering 
shade for the visitor and sustenance for its diverse wildlife but also pure water and 
fresh oxygen for humankind.” Id. at 1121. The roadless rule EIS stated that the 
“purpose and need” of the rule was “1) to immediately stop activities that have the 
greatest likelihood of degrading desirable characteristics of inventoried roadless areas, 
2) to ensure that ecological and social characteristics of inventoried roadless and other 
unroaded areas are identified and considered through local forest planning efforts, and 
3) to consider the unique social and economic situation of the Tongass National 
Forest.” U.S. FOREST SERVICE, ROADLESS AREA CONSERVATION DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SUMMARY AND PROPOSED RULES 4–5 (May 2000), 
available at http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5139061.pdf. 
181. 313 F.3d at 1122 (“Protecting the roadless areas of our national forests from 
further degradation can hardly be termed unreasonably narrow.”) (referring to City of 
Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(ruling that NEPA analysis of highway realignment project, including the alternatives 
analysis, was adequate)). 
182. Id. at 1122–23 (“[I]t would turn NEPA on its head to interpret the statute to 
require that the Forest Service conduct in-depth analyses of environmentally 
damaging alternatives that are inconsistent with the Forest Service’s conservation 
policy objectives.”). 
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roadless areas.183 
C. The Effect of Reducing the Range of Alternatives for 
Conservation Actions 
Kootenai Tribe’s ruling relaxing alternatives analysis review 
for conservation actions has yet to receive much attention from 
other courts.184 However, the Tenth Circuit recently upheld the 
roadless rule as complying with NEPA, marking the possible 
end of the tortuous litigation on that subject. 
In 2003, the District of Wyoming ruled that the roadless rule 
EIS violated NEPA by including inadequate alternatives 
analysis.185 The Tenth Circuit reversed, deciding that the 
district court’s decision was moot after the Bush 
Administration adopted a different roadless rule, known as the 
“state petitions rule.”186 Then, the Northern District of 
                                               
183. Id. Judge Kleinfeld wrote a partial dissent, opining that by failing to analyze 
an alternative that did not ban all road construction, the Forest Service failed to take 
the required “hard look” at the effects of the roadless rule. Id. at 1126–31 (Kleinfeld, 
J., dissenting). He then repeated that “[t]he existence of a viable but unexamined 
alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate.” Id. at 1129 
(quoting Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1307 (9th Cir. 1994) (ruling that 
the Forest Service’s Flathead National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan 
and the forest-wide EIS violated the ESA by causing jeopardy for threatened grizzly 
bears, but holding that the EIS, including the alternatives analysis, satisfied NEPA)). 
Kleinfeld’s conclusions conflicted with the majority’s view that NEPA did not require 
consideration of environmentally harmful alternatives that were beyond the proposed 
action’s purpose and need, as stated in the EIS. Id. at 1126–31. 
184. Kootenai Tribe’s ruling has generated two positive citations in the Ninth 
Circuit. See Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 871 (9th Cir. 
2004) (ruling that an EIS on managing flows in the Trinity River included a 
reasonable range of alternatives); Pac. Coast Fed’n Of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Locke, No. 
C 10–04790 CRB, 2011 WL 3443533, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (holding that an 
EIS on establishing a limited access fishing program in the Pacific coast groundfish 
fishery included a reasonable range of alternatives). Additionally, the District of 
Wyoming gave it passing reference when ruling that the roadless rule EIS had 
inadequate alternatives analysis. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Wyoming I), 277 F. 
Supp. 2d 1197, 1203 (D. Wyo. 2003). 
185. 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (“[T]he Forest Service did not give each reasonable 
alternative substantial treatment in the EIS or take a hard look at the environmental 
consequences of its actions.”). 
186. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Wyoming II), 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 
2005). The state petitions rule “eliminated the uniform national protections of roadless 
areas from road construction and reconstruction and timber harvesting, reverting to 
the prior regime of forest-by-forest plans, but adding an optional state-by-state 
petitioning process to alter the level of protection of roadless areas within individual 
state borders from that afforded by the forest plans. If a state’s petition were accepted, 
rulemaking on management of roadless areas within that state would begin, although 
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California enjoined the Bush state petitions rule, reinstating 
the 2001 Clinton roadless rule.187 The state of Wyoming  
challenged the reinstated Clinton rule on the same grounds it 
was attacked in the Ninth Circuit—for failing to consider a 
reasonable range of alternatives—and the district court 
enjoined the rule in Wyoming v. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.188 But the Tenth Circuit reversed, deciding that 
the Forest Service permissibly narrowed the range of 
alternatives in the EIS’s purpose and need statement.189 The 
court decided that the Forest Service reasonably concluded 
that road construction and harvesting timber were the 
activities most harmful to roadless areas, and therefore the 
agency could limit the range of alternatives considered to 
restrictions on those activities.190 Having properly limited the 
purpose and need of the proposed action, the Tenth Circuit 
determined that the range of alternatives analyzed by the 
Forest Service’s EIS was reasonable.191 
The Tenth Circuit thus agreed with the Ninth Circuit that 
the range of alternatives was not too narrow, although its 
rationale for the relaxed range of alternatives was not 
expressly because the roadless was an environmentally 
protective action.192 Thus, it is not entirely clear if the Tenth 
                                               
individual forest plans would guide forest management starting immediately upon the 
rule’s promulgation until changed in a state by rulemaking. For those states which did 
not petition, forest plans would continue to govern roadless areas.” California ex rel. 
Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
187. The Forest Service promulgated the state petitions rule without any NEPA 
analysis or consultation under the ESA. Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 893–919. The 
district court ruled that the Forest Service had violated both Acts, the court then 
enjoined the state petitions rule and reinstated the roadless rule. Id. 
188. Wyoming I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1339–40 (“[T]he Forest Service’s preordained 
conception of what a roadless area would be, and its schedule for implementing the 
final rule, caused the Forest Service to drive the Roadless Rule through the 
administrative process without weighing the pros and cons of reasonable alternatives 
to the Roadless Rule.”). 
189. Wyoming II, 661 F.3d at 1250. 
190. Id. at 1245–46 (“[T]he Forest Service’s decision to limit the alternatives 
considered . . . was reasonable in light of its conclusion, based on ample evidence 
presented in the EIS, that [road construction and timber harvest] posed the greatest 
risk of destroying the characteristics of [roadless areas], which the proposed rule was 
intended to protect and preserve.”). 
191. Id. at 1250. 
192. Id. at 1245–46 (“[A]ny alternative permitting road construction to a greater 
extent would not further the defined objective of the Roadless Rule and would 
therefore not be ‘reasonable.’”). 
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Circuit will approve a reduced range of alternatives in other 
EISs on conservation actions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress passed NEPA intending it to provide significant 
and unprecedented protection for the environment.193 NEPA 
calls on federal agencies to make special efforts to ensure that 
“man and nature can exist in productive harmony.”194 To 
accomplish this goal, the statute established detailed 
procedures for agencies to demonstrate detailed consideration 
of the environmental consequences of their actions and to 
publicly disclose those effects. The Ninth Circuit has fostered 
NEPA’s environmental purpose by distinguishing conservation 
measures from other federal proposals and subjecting actions 
protecting the environment to a different standard than 
actions likely to harm the environment. This interpretation is 
consistent with CEQ’s instruction that NEPA’s purpose is to 
help officials reach informed decisions that protect the 
environment.195 
The four rules discussed in this paper concern different 
points in the NEPA process. The first involves who has 
standing to bring court challenges; the second pertains to 
actions that trigger NEPA analysis; the third concerns when 
an EIS is required; the fourth concerns the sufficiency of 
alternatives analysis in an EIS when the proposal aims to 
protect the environment.  
The common thread among these rules is the Ninth Circuit’s 
willingness to put the policy of NEPA to “create and maintain 
                                               
193. See 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson) 
(“[I]t is my view that [NEPA] is the most important and far-reaching environmental 
and conservation measure ever passed by the Congress”); 115 CONG. REC. 40,926 
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969) (statement of Rep. Saylor) (“[T]he importance of this 
legislation cannot be overstated”); id. at 40,925–26 (statement of Rep. Garmatz) 
(“[T]he ugly and devastating disease of pollution has contaminated every aspect of our 
environment—air, land, and water. The problem is so vast and interrelated, one 
segment of the environment cannot be separated from another. The only logical and 
practical approach is a broad-ranging, coordinated Federal program, as is proposed in 
this legislation.”). 
194. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006). 
195. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (2012) (“The NEPA process is intended to help public 
officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental 
consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment. 
These regulations provide the direction to achieve this purpose.”). 
41
Blumm and Mosman: The Overlooked Role of the National Environmental Policy Act in P
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
234 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:2 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive 
harmony” into practice.196 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretations 
discussed in this paper all flow from that court’s refusal to lose 
sight of Congress’s fundamental environmental purpose in 
enacting NEPA.197 If the Ninth Circuit’s interpretations were 
more widely adopted by other circuits, both NEPA’s purpose 
and its procedures would be better served. 
                                               
196. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006). 
197. See supra notes 28–30, 33, 88 and accompanying text. 
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